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Executive Summary 
 
Businesses and Governments are seeking new ways to improve their products 
and services, make them cost effective and take advantage of global sourcing 
options. 
 
This has been largely enabled by fast, stable communication networks sharing 
vast volumes of data to facilitate delivery of services to customers.  Sharing has 
led to concerns over data protection and the risks the data faces in the new open 
business models called Digital Business Networks. 
 
Sharing data with partners to meet business objectives requires trust from both 
parties.  Trust is difficult to build which is why organisations use a number of 
different methods to establish trust such as contracts, audits, etc.  These have 
inherent issues which cannot easily be addressed. 
 
The current security landscape of controls, countermeasures and mitigation 
strategies have not changed significantly therefore new ways are being sought to 
deliver improved security.  This need is increasing as organisations move 
towards new open de-perimeterised seamless business process models. 
 
Trusted Computing using a Trusted Platform Module claims to offer higher 
security for platforms leading to better data assurance and lower risk levels as 
well as protecting platforms from malicious code. 
 
This paper seeks to establish if Trusted Computing can offer lower risks and 
greater data assurance against platforms attacks when compared with current 
controls. 
 
A detailed risk assessment was performed of risks to data on current platforms, 
and then a further comparator assessment was performed assuming Trusted 
Computing Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) controls were deployed. 
 
This comparison suggests that Trusted Computing does indeed reduce the 
platform risks to data by up to 67%.  However, due to the low adoption of the 
Trusted Computing TPM technology today, there are currently few applications 
using this new technology.  This is expected to change as leading manufacturers 
of processor chips develop integrated functions within their processors, which will 
facilitate more applications to use the TPM in the medium to long term. 
 
There are other challenges which need to be overcome before TPM usage 
becomes common place.  This includes a Public Key Infrastructure with 
certificate authorities aiding the use of the TPM.  Deployment of TPM will need to 
extend from mainly laptops today to servers before organisations can use them 
for their critical data. 
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The microprocessor manufacturers will also need to improve on isolation 
technologies to support commonly used virtualisation solutions.  Operating 
system and application vendors will also need a standard method for software 
hash checks support proving the integrity of software. 
 
Trusted Computing with TPM offers a great step forward in protecting data from 
platform attacks as the current protection mechanisms have not changed 
significantly over recent years and in the author’s opinion are largely not effective 
against today’s attack methods.  The technology needs to mature on many fronts 
before applications are developed and organisations gain the confidence to use 
it.  However in the author’s opinion it is simply a matter of time before the 
required enablers are in place to allow wide spread adoption. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
 
Over recent years, the pharmaceutical industry has been going through 
an unprecedented level of change.  This has been driven by the global 
competitive market for drugs with few new high market value drugs, 
patient expiration on existing drugs and research and development 
taking 10-15 years [1] on occasions.  Regulatory requirements also 
make the drug development process longer before a drug can be 
released into the market.  
  
This has put pressure on business operating models to reduce costs in 
order to maintain competitive advantage and pursue new cost effective 
operating models.  The days when new compounds were researched 
and developed inside the business and marketed by internal teams are 
no longer viable. 
 
Collaboration with business partners offers the opportunity to share 
costs, knowledge, information and expertise to develop and market 
drugs. 
 
In the context of this paper, a Partner is defined as any entity from 
which the business buys service provision or is engaged in a business 
relationship. 
 
These Partnerships are formed with many sectors including hospitals, 
doctors, IT service providers, research companies and universities both 
locally and globally. 
  
Collaboration means sharing facilities and confidential business 
information including patient data, personal information, intellectual 
property, research information and price information.  Given the time 
and resources taken to develop drugs, these data assets are of high 
value to businesses and their competitors.  The aspects of data 
security are not always within control of the data controller or owner but 
instead the Partner organisation. 
 
To allow seamless integration in these Partnerships, many businesses 
are driving towards de-perimeterisation [2] and the general direction 
advocated by the Jericho forum [3].  The idea that perimeter controls 
(such as firewalls, proxy’s, routers, etc) will be complimentary to 
controls on the actual data is an important concept going forward. 
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The author suggests, despite the awareness and alarm over data loss, 
there seems to be a constant stream of data breaches as highlighted in 
the press [7], [8], [9], [10], and [11].  The issue will persist unless better 
controls are implemented. 
 
Data loss can be attributed to human errors, deliberate acts or 
malicious activity and not forgetting criminals using vulnerabilities in 
software.  These include but not limited to programmatic code [12] or 
applications installed with backdoors called root kits [13].  SANS a 
respected security research organisation highlights 25 of the top 
programming errors and information on how to fix those [70].  However, 
the same errors are continually present in applications as confirmed by 
the organisations weekly publication. 
 
This highlights the need to have good control over all aspects of 
information security including people, technology and business 
processes.  These controls should be implemented in an effective 
manner to establish trust in an organisations ability to look after data. 
 
This paper explores if Trusted Computing can provide that additional 
level of data assurance and trust to allow organisations to build more 
confidence in sharing data when working with Partners.  
 
This level of assurance will be determined and assessed by conducting 
a security risk assessment on the Trusted Platform Module used in 
implementations of Trusted Computing. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
The objectives of this paper are to: 
 
1. Outline the context of data sharing and why organisations need 
to share data; 
 
2. Outline business challenges in trying to establish trust in data 
sharing relationships; 
 
3. Perform a risk assessment to establish if Trusted Computing 
controls can offer reduced risk and better data assurance on 
platforms processing sensitive data; and 
 
4. Outline any challenges which may prevent Trusted Computing 
adoption  
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1.3 Scope 
 
The scope of this study is to look at data sharing in business and 
governments through the use of a pharmaceutical organisation for 
setting context for the risk assessments.  It is assumed that many of 
the challenges faced by pharmaceutical organisations are common to 
general business and governments.  
 
The risk assessment will attempt to establish if a Trusted Platform 
Module used in Trusted Computing can offer improved platform 
security, lower risk and greater assurance for data integrity and 
confidentially.  
 
The paper will put forward in the author’s view, the challenges for 
Trusted Computing adoption. 
 
1.4 Organisation 
 
The report is broken down into the following chapters: 
 
Chapter 1 – Sets out the context of the study, the objectives and 
scope. 
 
Chapter 2 – This chapter sets the scene and discusses data sharing. 
Why data is shared, some of the drivers for data sharing as well as how 
data is shared.  The author then explores some of the advantages and 
challenges with data sharing. 
 
Chapter 3 – This chapter discusses trust and how organisations try 
and establish trust and the associated challenges in business 
relationships. Some of the commonly used methods to establish trust 
and their challenges are highlighted. 
 
Chapter 4 - Explores the security landscape and outlines some of the 
drivers and requirements for data security.  The author explores some 
of the challenges in meeting those requirements.  
 
Chapter 5 – An overview of Trusted Computing is provided, focusing 
on the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) which aims to give the reader 
context for the risk assessment.  A model for business to business data 
sharing is outlined using Trusted Computing.  The author then explores 
in their view, some of the challenges for the adoption of Trusted 
Computing technology.  
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Chapter 6 – In this chapter, the risk assessment process is described 
along with the methodology for the assessments.  A comparison of the 
risk profile with just best practice controls and the differences 
introduced with using TPM is considered and discussed. 
 
Chapter 7 – The author’s view of the conclusions that can be draw 
from the study. 
 
Chapter 8 – References used during this study 
 
Appendices – Appendix A-D contains some of the supporting data 
used during the generation of this paper. 
 
Appendix E – Includes the completed Project Description Form. 
 
 
 14 
 
2 Data Sharing in Business 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the wider context of why businesses need to 
share information and the types of information that is often shared 
when providing services to each other and their customers.  A range of 
different mechanisms can be employed to facilitate information sharing 
which is also discussed. 
 
The Data Protection Act (DPA) and Human Rights Act (HRA) set out 
the legal obligations that different parties have to each other when they 
share information.  This paper discusses the effectiveness of the 
legislation. 
 
This paper centers on the challenges faced by pharmaceutical 
businesses and the pharmaceutical industry.  However in the author’s 
opinion these challenges are common across different industries and 
Governments and therefore the considerations put forward in this paper 
apply more broadly. 
 
2.2 Information Challenges Faced by Businesses 
 
Pharmaceutical businesses face a number of challenges including 
fewer new drugs in the pipeline, greater competition, high cost of 
research and development, maintaining regional sales forces, long 
development cycles and maintaining robust internal structures to meet 
legal and regulatory requirements [1]. 
 
Pharmaceutical businesses can be considered a collection of business 
processes that operate to manage information and data to deliver new 
and improved products to customers.  Therefore the management of 
information and data is a fundamental imperative for pharmaceuticals 
and indeed any business.   
 
To maintain an effective operation whilst meeting the challenges of 
shrinking markets, tougher competition and the difficult economic 
climate, businesses are driven to look for innovative ways to minimise 
operating costs and reduce time to market.   
 
One approach to achieve these strategic goals is the use of global 
sourcing [2] which involves working with business partners in different 
geographies to provide complimentary expertise, services, and 
products.  This allows businesses to focus on core value added 
business activities and outsource non-core activities. 
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Forrester, a leading research organisation, calls these collaborative 
alliances, Digital Business Networks [3]. Using Digital Business 
Networks as well as existing business to business partnerships allows 
companies to embrace change and take advantage of the Global 
Market Place [3] 
 
For example, pharmaceutical businesses core focus is on the 
development of medical products and it employs Information 
Technology (IT) to facilitate this objective.   
 
These new business models require seamless business processes to 
cross national and international boundaries whist sharing critical 
business data with outsourcing Partners [4].  This is facilitated by stable 
network connections and the internet whilst potentially relaxing existing 
security controls at the perimeter to allow applications to work. 
 
In the author’s opinion, there is a perception that using business 
process outsourcers and data processing partnerships is similar to 
purchasing any other utility such as gas or electricity.  This perception 
is reinforced by new models such as Software as a Service (SaaS) 
where business use software as and when needed.  The author 
believes, this may not be suitable for all services, especially when 
considering cost in the context of the potential impact on quality and 
risk. 
 
In the authors experience such arrangements mean relaxing of security 
controls or opening more communication paths to allow poorly or 
indeed badly developed applications to operate, which ultimately 
places additional risks on the organisation.  
 
For example, Oracle (a commonly used data base management 
application product suite) requires a large network port range to be 
opened in the firewalls because different functions select different 
network ports at the time of use.  Therefore firewalls and intrusion 
detection systems need to accommodate this following a waiver from 
senior management to accept the risk.  This is directly at odds with 
generally accepted good practice for applications to be restricted to 
selected ports [71]  
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2.3 What Data is Shared 
 
Pharmaceutical organisation share a wide range of information 
between business partners to enable inter-organisational business 
processes to operate for competitive advantage.   
 
The types of information shared include: 
 
• Drug research data  
• Clinical trials data 
• Human Resources information 
• Finance information 
• Payroll details 
• Competitor / Market Analysis data 
• Sales and Marketing data 
• Financial Market Data 
 
The value of this information varies and in many instances can be 
considered trade secrets.  For example drug trial data is collected from 
a large number of parties over long periods of time (sometimes 
between 10-15 years), from doctors, hospitals and development 
companies, etc. 
 
The collection of this data must comply with regulatory compliance 
which serves to protect the integrity of the data being collected in an 
auditable manner.  This type of exercise is costly and is commercially 
sensitive.  
 
It is important to protect this information from unauthorised access or 
disclosure.  If this information became accessible to unauthorised 
parties, then the consequences to the business will be extremely 
negative.  For example, loss of reputation, share value reduction, loss 
of customers and their perception etc.  Reputations can take many 
years to build but can be lost very quickly.  
 
Much of the information shared by pharmaceutical businesses map 
directly to other private sector organisations where medical data can be 
swapped for other product information.  The Government however 
differs from private sector organisations in the information it shares. 
   
In a report produced in July 2008 by Richard Thomas, Information 
Commissioner and Mark Walport, Director of the Welcome Trust [5], 
where they looked at data sharing in the Government and the public 
services.  They highlighted three major areas where data sharing plays 
a critical role in delivering public services which are the following: 
 
1. Law Enforcement and Public Protection 
2. Service Delivery 
3. Research and Statistics. 
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Unlike most of the information shared by pharmaceuticals and private 
sector organisations, most of the information shared by the government 
departments relates to Citizen Information or Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII). 
 
The broadest category of shared Government information is that of 
Service Delivery (2), and encompasses a vast array of different 
services (and related information) from a large number of public bodies 
as indicated below. 
 
• Local authorities:  council tax, housing, democratic services, 
education, libraries, social services, waste management and, 
environmental services 
 
• Departments, Agencies and Non-Departmental Public 
Bodies:  policing, court services, prisons, probation, medical 
records, self assessment and tax records, etc. 
 
Following the Gershon Review [59] the Government is seeking to 
reshape itself to introduce greater efficiencies.  Shared services have 
been identified by the Cabinet Office as a strategic approach to 
delivering these efficiencies across the Government as identified in the 
Transformational Government white paper [58].  This initiative 
highlights the streamlining of public services and corporate services 
such as HR, finance and procurement and targets £1.3billon of savings 
per annum by a 20% efficiency improvement.  The Government is 
sharing information in vast volumes and this is expected to increase. 
 
The author, agrees that sharing information across Government will 
bring valued added services for citizens but at what cost?  The 
introduction of shared databases such as ID Cards and DNA has many 
opponents as these are considered steps towards the ‘big brother’ 
state.  Recent news articles highlighting loss of PII data by the 
Government whilst trying to share information has left the public even 
more skeptical and dubious of the Governments ability to manage this 
national asset.  
 
In the author’s opinion, more protection frameworks are needed or 
existing protection frameworks need to become more robust.  Only 
when these are in place can the public be assured that their information 
is being appropriately looked after. 
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2.4 Data Protection and Human Rights Acts 
 
In the general activities of commerce and Government, data will be 
collected, processed and potentially sold on, for example the electoral 
roll information [6].  When data is shared the parties involved should be 
aware of their legal obligations relating to collection, storage and 
processing. 
 
The Human Rights Act asserts that individuals have the right for 
personal privacy.  The Data Protection Act (DPA) is a general act and 
is based on self regulation.  It places obligations on organisations and 
individuals in the management and handling of personal data with 
emphasis given to ensure personal privacy is maintained and protected 
with data being collected and processed for a specific purpose.   
 
For example, the Data Protection Act [7] and the Human Rights Act 
1998 article 8 [8] are of particular interest to processing of medical 
health data in pharmaceutical data processing.  A business is in breach 
and liable with respect to a patients rights if due care is not taken when 
the patient data is processed, stored and distributed. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, global relationships are driving 
the need for cross border commerce.  In this regard, concern has been 
raised about the legal implications of collecting, processing and 
movement of data between European member states saying “sharing 
data across and between organisations can be a complex process” 
with no single regulatory advice for data sharing ([5a] – Thomas and 
Walport).  
 
To provide enhanced protection, organisations often use specific 
contracts with data protection provisions between each other that 
develop and clarify the principles laid out within the Data Protection Act 
(DPA) [7]. 
 
Whilst protection may be available, not all companies handle data in a 
careful manner.  In the Thomas and Walport report [5b], The British 
Computer Society said “the enforcement mechanisms for the DPA are 
insufficient: breaches that may cause considerable suffering for 
individuals, such as damaged credit reference histories, rarely result in 
any meaningful penalty for data controllers”. 
 
This was further reinforced by Richard Thomas, the information 
commissioner, at the European RSA conference, that his office was 
currently investigating 30 serious cases of breach [9].  In the author’s 
opinion this appears to be a very small number of cases given the vast 
array of businesses that the DPA applies to. 
 
Given the restrictions in the DPA with respect to use of gathered data, 
following the report on data sharing [5],[5b], the Government sought to 
allow for greater sharing by introducing a clause into the Coroners and 
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Justice Bill (Clause 154) allowing for  data to be marked for sharing 
[71].  However the Government recently announced in an open letter 
from Justice Minister Michael Willis that this clause will be removed. 
 
A quote from a privacy campaign group conveys the broader social 
dimension and tension in this debate on data sharing [71].  This quote 
was in response to Coroners and Justice Bill (Clause 154) amendment. 
 
According to Privacy International's Director, Simon Davies: "this is an 
extraordinary U-turn but we cannot be led into a false sense of security. 
We congratulate the Government on its decision, but it was inevitable 
given how badly the clause have been drafted and how morally corrupt 
its outcome would have been.  Nobody should be under the illusion that 
the Government has changed its colours with regard to its zeal for 
surveillance.  This could be merely a blip, so we all have to remain 
vigilant for the next assault of privacy." 
 
It is the author’s opinion that the legal authorities and the Government 
recognise that existing frameworks for sharing are not sufficient or 
robust enough to hold up in court of law if tested. 
 
The author’s view is that the Government and private sector 
businesses need to do far more to control data with respect to the DPA 
and the current breaches are a tip of the iceberg, i.e. there are more 
breaches than is reported.  The author believes many private sector 
businesses may treat data protection as a ‘tick the box’ activity in 
partnering relationships.  The author concurs with the report [5] that the 
information commissioner needs more powers to ensure the legislation 
is taken more seriously.  In support of the legislation is the need for 
practical technical solutions to support the legislative obligations.   
 
2.5 How is Data Shared? 
Businesses have a wide range of methods available to facilitate data 
sharing depending on the differing requirements.  The method 
employed is very important as the method of transfer will in many 
cases dictate the level of protection afforded to the data.  For example, 
people send an email which is similar to sending letters in the post with 
one critical exception – the use of a transparent envelope. 
 
The methods of communication employed are driven by volume of data 
involved, timeliness, quality, availability, privacy and cost 
considerations.  Mechanisms include dedicated network links; use of a 
Wide Area Network (WAN); use of the Internet (which is by far the most 
common method) to the physical transport of media. 
 
In pharmaceutical businesses, data exchanges can occur daily via high 
speed communication links to transport high volumes of data.  For 
example data extracted as a result of a DNA scan as part of research 
and development. 
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However, regardless of the method of transportation when human 
beings are involved in the process, a mistake or error of judgment can 
lead to data breaches as can be seen here [20] [21]  [22] [24] [25] [26] 
[27].  Education on security matters is very important if an organisation 
wants to maintain it security posture and risk profile. 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
Public and private sector organisations are looking for innovative ways 
of improving business operations and processes using Digital Business 
Networks to gain competitive advantage.  These networks form a web 
of connections sharing a wide range of different types of data in vast 
volumes.  The data includes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to 
sensitive company information which may have taken years to gather, 
for example drug trial information.  This data becomes distributed 
across multiple Partners and therefore needs to be protected in a 
consistent manner to maintain integrity and confidentially. 
 
Protection is provided by the Data Protection Act [7] and the Human 
rights act [8].  Both are concerned with maintaining personal privacy 
and ensuring data is collected, processed and stored in a lawful way. 
 
All organisations including Government are mandated to comply with 
the Data Protection Act but in a self regulatory manner i.e. they must 
sign up the act and are responsible for reporting breaches.  As a result, 
there have been few reported cases of data breaches from the private 
sector. 
   
Data protection is critical to pharmaceutical organisations because they 
are obligated to follow regulatory practices with any breach leading to 
potential closure of business operations. 
  
The public wants efficient public services and cost savings but they are 
reluctant to trust organisations including the Government with personal 
information given the recent data breaches, such as the high profile 
data breaches in the public sector which suggests that Government in 
particular is not ready to share data in large volumes. 
 
The author believes stronger powers should be given to the Information 
Commissioner to conduct spot checks, audits and conduct 
investigations in both public and private organisations with significant 
penalties for breaches.  
 
Organisations for their part should ensure contracts include clear 
unambiguous written agreements on data protection with specific 
clauses, setting out the agreement on regular reviews of information 
security to be carried out as part of the relationship. 
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3 Managing Trust 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers how trust is generated within business 
partnerships and the consequences of losing trust including exploring 
some of the human factors in these relationships. 
 
Consideration is given to some of the methods available to build 
confidence and trust between partners as well as exploring some of the 
challenges and issues with those approaches. 
 
3.2 Trust in Business Relationships 
 
It was once said to the author “Trust takes a lifetime to build but can be 
lost in a flash”.  For example, a family member may be trusted to not 
steal your bank details and use it without your permission, but if they 
did would your trust in them to the same level as before? 
 
With the banking crisis, pensioners have lost a huge proportion of their 
savings [12] when they entrusted their money management to large 
established banks only to find those organisations took advice from 
other established organisations without questioning the validity of what 
was being offered.   
 
Given that trust is so fragile and fundamental requirement for humans, 
it is not a surprise trust levels cannot be maintained when things do not 
go as expected.  Both the pensioners and the family member will think 
twice and have lower confidence in engaging in a similar situation. 
 
Public trust and confidence in the current economic climate is very low 
given recent news events, for example the Northern Rock crisis [12] 
highlighted the effect a news story has on a bank when people started 
to queue to withdraw their money, the government had to intervene to 
restore order 
 
Trust in the bank may have been founded on reputation, 
recommendation from a trusted source or from independent statistical 
information setting out past performance.  Statistical information from 
independent parties instills more confidence within the receiver than 
statistics produced by public bodies, businesses and Government.  
This is confirmed by a report published by the Office of National 
Statistics [10], a quote from the report conveys this sentiment 
“Participants emphasised that the independence of statistical services 
was one of the most important factors for ensuring confidence in 
statistics.”  
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The principle of buyer be aware applies in all situations when dealing 
with banks, which in business would translate to due diligence, using 
some of the methods discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Another story [13] reported an alleged problem with a drug produced by 
a pharmaceutical company which resulted in the news article stating 
“Investors, doctors, patients and medical malpractice lawyers are 
watching closely what steps legislators and regulators will take.” 
  
This may not sound very serious until consideration is given to the 
amount of money this drug produces for the business which was 
reported to be above $3 billon dollars.  Should shareholders perceive 
this company as a bad investment and lose trust and start to sell their 
shares then this can have a significant impact on the organisations.  
Indeed, as a result of this article, the company’s value on the stock 
market dropped by $1 billon dollars in four days and was continuing to 
slide.  This highlights the importance of trust through brand loyalty, 
reputation and public perception. 
 
Given the importance of trust to all organisations and its fragile nature, 
it is critical that businesses protect the trust that their business Partners 
and customers place in them.  Establishing a common understanding in 
Partnerships and rules of engagement is critical to the success of the 
business and the Partnership.  
 
There are many methods available that serve to highlight to existing 
and new business Partners and customers that confidence and trust 
can be given in working with an organisation.  Some of the approaches 
available include: 
 
• Contracts 
• Accreditations such as BS ISO/IEC 27001. 
• Audits 
• Site visits and Inspections 
• Review of Technical Controls 
• Questionnaires 
• Interviews 
• Due Diligence 
• Reviewing Internal Partner Processes such as Change 
Management, Incident Management and Problem Management. 
• Information Security Heath Checks 
• Risk Assessments 
• Team Building Events 
• Recommendations from other Companies 
• Performance Reviews against Key Performance Indicators (KPI) 
 
There numerous resources available where further information can be 
found, for example BS ISO/IEC 2005:2008, and BS ISO/IEC 27001 & 
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27002.  This paper discusses a few of these in the following sections to 
outline some of the challenges. 
 
3.3 Challenges to Establishing Trust  
 
The methods listed in the previous section all help in the establishment 
of trust and assurance in a Partner and they in the business; given it is 
a two way relationship.  Not all of the methods are deployed in every 
situation and the methods will not solve all problems but used in a 
collective way will go some way to establishing trust.  
 
Businesses have many relationships with Partners to support their 
operational activities, so any management of these relationships has to 
manage factors such as locations, resources and skills to ensure the 
relationship runs smoothly. 
 
At an open industry forum held in December 2008 in London to discuss 
“Outsourcing and Third Party Security Risks” [14] an attendee said “We 
have 18,000 suppliers and share data with many of them”.  This 
particular attendee was highlighting that it is not possible to check 
every partner on a regular or annual basis, so alternative approaches 
would be welcomed.   
 
The author suggests a risk based approach to prioritise activities is 
employed to make use of limited resources.  
The following sections review a few of the most commonly used 
approaches to establishing trust and some of the considerations in 
these methods to highlight potential issues where trust can be affected. 
 
3.3.1 Contracts 
 
This section discusses the key points in the contracting process and 
puts forward the author’s views and experience with respect to 
challenges in managing a data sharing relationship.  It is not intended 
to be a legal narrative. 
 
Contracts set out the obligations, accountabilities and responsibilities 
(through express and implied terms, exemption clauses, outline of 
service levels, etc) between a business and its Partner.  These clauses 
need to be understood by all parties and an agreement reached on 
escalation and dispute resolution mechanism in case something goes 
wrong.  The contract is usually agreed between senior managers from 
the business and the partner. 
 
In the author’s view a number of problems creep in to the contract due 
to the process by which the contract is drafted and the importance 
placed on information and data security.  These problems often surface 
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when the relationship is strained and one party reaches for the 
contracts folder only to be surprised by the content and its implications. 
 
At the time of drafting a contract is a critical focus when all parties are 
very keen and flexible in their dealings with each other.  A discussion 
takes place between business managers who have a need that is 
addressed by the Partner and are keen to strike a deal.   
 
Information security is often not considered unless an organisation is 
mature from an information security perspective and has the relevant 
resources.  An appropriate information security specialist may be 
engaged however this is often seen as a low priority and often not 
regarded as a deal breaker should problems be identified.   
 
The Partner will not spend money improving information security when 
the contract does not mandate for it to happen.  Ultimately, should this 
be mandated, the costs would be incurred by the business through 
service charges. 
 
Whilst contracts offer a means of establishing trust and control. 
Contracts are signed by senior managers however the operational 
aspects of the Partnership are managed and operated by staff who 
have limited or no visibility as to their responsibilities which can cause 
problems for the relationship. 
 
The author asserts that in many cases the clauses are generic to a 
point that any breach of information security becomes unenforceable; 
in which case the parties accept the failure and hope they can improve 
the process in future.   
Should the breach be very serious then both parties may resort to legal 
means to get a resolution, which will only sour the relationship and 
place both organisations into a position where trust is lost. 
 
This brings into focus, who is taking the risk when a breach takes 
place.  The author suggests that the business is taking the risk as it has 
a reputation and a brand value to protect.  Therefore it can be argued 
that the business needs to take extra care in these relationships.  
Contracts may not always provide the redress to certain situations. 
 
For example, in January 2009, a provider of outsourcing services was 
hit by a scandal of corporate fraud [66].  Businesses were not able to 
exit from this relationship in a controlled manner and had to obey the 
contracts in place.  This sent shock waves through the corporate 
community who started to look at ways of managing this risk and 
therefore this undermined trust. 
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3.3.2 Accreditation to BS / ISO IEC27001:2005 & 27002:2005 
 
The BS / ISO IEC27001:2005 & 27002:2005 standard is provided as 
guidance to businesses to measure their security practices and draw 
guidance on controls that need to be implemented.  The standard 
offers categories of risk and controls which should be implemented as 
appropriate for the organisation.  
 
Previously the standard was called BS7799.  During this time, many 
organisations seeking to implement Information Security Management 
Systems (ISMS) found it difficult to interpret and apply the standard as 
it was set out in a blueprint form, whereas the current standard is more 
practically set out as guidance. 
 
In the author’s opinion, a business entering a Partnership should 
review the application of the generic controls to ensure they are 
justified and must be documented in the statement of applicability as it 
applies to the Partners business.  Therefore when a partner claims 
compliance a complete review of the process and on going 
management practices should be conducted.  The standard requires 
continual application by the Plan, Do, Check and Act cycle to ensure 
the standard is used as intended and is not a one time event. 
 
Furthermore, checks should be made on the application of controls 
within standard.  This does not refer solely to the technical controls on 
a data sharing relationship but sections 5-15 of 27002:2005 are of 
particular importance and should be used as a guide during reviews 
and audits. 
 
The authors acknowledges that this is a good standard deployed in 
excellent ways by many businesses however for the purposes of due 
diligence, the author suggests an expedient way to check compliance 
may be to contact the company who carried out the accreditation 
review.  
  
3.3.3 Audits 
 
Audits are a helpful way to establish if a partner is doing what they 
have documented or agreed with the business.  Audits are reliant on 
documented processes, procedures, local instructions, Service Level 
Agreements (SLA) and Operational Level Agreements (OLA) as well as 
industry best practices to which an audit is performed against.  The 
implied view is that if something is not documented then it is not being 
performed.  The author views this as rather short sighted, however it 
does help to define a baseline which reviews can be conducted 
against. 
 
Businesses have internal audit functions to maintain compliance and 
ensure regulatory oversight.  However this does not mean everything is 
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reviewed and highlighted for remediation.  When it comes to auditing a 
Partner, this may be done by site visits; questionnaires; interviews; 
inspection of processes and procedures.  These are often carried out 
under heightened circumstances which are outside of day to day 
activity i.e. partners will be more alert and attentive during these 
inspections, so a business may not always see a true picture of the 
operation. 
 
Consideration should be given to how often the audit will be carried out. 
In any Partnership, if this is done too often it will erode trust and mutual 
respect and too seldom may mean issues will turn into incidents.  This 
must be managed appropriately and set out in a formal contract which 
will introduce an element of legitimacy to the process without making 
any parties feel uncomfortable as this will be agreed in advance. 
 
The key issue here in the authors view, is that audits are essentially 
probing and recording activity a Partner may be providing over a short 
duration, possibly a week or two.  Therefore it may not be possible to 
interview and talk with all staff to get their views.  It is also normal when 
conversations are being conducted with operational staff; a request is 
made which allows the Partner to select the best person for the 
interview and not the other members who may not be appropriately 
trained. 
 
The author recommends that to build long term mutual trust an audit 
should be conducted in a fair and collaborative manner.  This assists in 
dispelling negative view of an audit but one must remember the audit in 
a Partner relationship is effectively the customer making a spot check 
so that everyone will be on their best behavior. 
 
3.3.4 Review of Technical Controls 
 
There are numerous security products on the market, ranging from risk 
management tools to end point protection.  A US security research 
organisation (CERT) published a report [16] which surveyed 671 
security executives and law enforcement officers who highlighted their 
top 10 most effective controls and their deployment (%): 
 
1. Stateful Firewalls (82%) 
2. Access Controls (79%) 
3. Electronic Access Controls (78%) 
4. Application Layer Firewalls (72%) 
5. Host based Anti-virus (70%) 
6. Password complexity (70%) 
7. Encryption (69%) 
8. Heuristics-based SPAM filtering (69%) 
9. Network based Policy enforcement (68) 
10. Network based anti-virus (65%) 
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The author suggests whilst these are very effective controls, they must 
be underpinned with effective processes and training for staff operating 
these controls.  This means simply deploying the controls is not enough 
in itself unless processes are there to inform staff on how to respond 
and take action when something is spotted beyond expected activity.  
 
Another issue with these controls is that they are often reliant on 
automatic alerting of events based on thresholds or signatures because 
appropriately trained staff often have limited time to review the large 
amount logs generated.  Therefore a targeted attack by a skilled 
attacker will slip under the radar because the automated system may 
not have the ability to detect or respond. 
 
There is a perception that deployed controls are capturing all security 
incidents which is leading to a higher level of confidence.  The same 
report [16] has highlighted over confidence amongst the respondents 
although the survey suggested e-crime being consistently steady in 
2007 against the previous year. A similar survey by BERR [17] 
suggests 87% of respondents are confident that they had caught all the 
significant security breaches. 
 
The author is surprised by the level of confidence from respondents. 
On what basis have these judgments been made? The author believes 
the lack of incidents detected within the organisation is creating this 
false sense of security.  There seems to be a misconception amongst 
technical security professionals that one can deploy a technology and it 
will provide total protection.  What is not taken into consideration is that 
people and processes are the other two factors which need to integrate 
into the security program.  
 
For example, insider attacks may be an issue, 67% of respondents 
were affected by an insider outlined in the Cert report [16]. However, 
the emphasis is still on the outsider being the attacker. 
 
In an article published by the Jericho Forum [15], John Arnold, chief 
security architect, said “Trust cannot be developed using technical 
security concepts alone; it must come from examining how humans 
create trust.” 
 
Although the list above seems to ticks all the boxes, the author would 
like to re-iterate that not everybody manages controls in the same 
manner; there may be Partners who simply deploy the technology.  The 
author recalls a story by a SANS auditor, who when auditing a 
business asked an analyst if they had a firewall to which the reply was 
yes.  When the SANS auditor asked to see it, he was taken to a cabinet 
where sure enough there was firewall but it was still in its box.  This 
illustrates the how security professional or senior management may not 
take security threats seriously because nobody followed up to ensure 
the firewall was installed. 
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This conveys the need to ask the most appropriate questions at all 
times when visiting a Partner.  In the data sharing relationship, there 
needs to be an oversight as to how these controls are being used and 
where they are being deployed.  This will create a true picture of what 
the risks are to the data. 
  
3.3.5 Penetration Testing Partner Systems 
 
Penetration testing is a process where a vulnerability scanner will scan 
a particular host or network in order to find any issues with servers, 
routers, firewalls.  Normally this is conducted on perimeter devices 
facing the internet.  However, there is no reason why a penetration test 
cannot be conducted against internal systems (systems processing the 
business data).  
 
A test performed with a quality tool or free tools run by an experienced 
penetration testers should give additional assurance of system 
soundness at a point in time.  There are lots of commercial tools 
available for this type of testing. 
New vulnerabilities are emerging on a regular basis, so the check can 
only be performed at point in time.  This is similar to getting an MOT 
carried out on car; as soon as you leave the garage it could be invalid. 
Penetration testing is good check for system vulnerabilities but it must 
be stressed that it’s only an indicator and should not be relied upon 
without further checks such as access controls mechanisms. 
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3.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the author highlighted the need for establishing trust in 
a business relationship and some of the foundations which could be 
used to build that trust. 
Managing trust is a difficult concept with businesses using contracts, 
audits, accreditations, technical controls etc to develop levels of trust. 
Each mechanism has its difficulties which the organisation needs to be 
aware so that it can choose the most appropriate way to build trust with 
its partners. 
For example, contracts may not have appropriate clauses for data 
protection; technical controls may not be managed appropriately 
allowing breaches to take place; accreditations may not include an 
appropriate scope leading to security weakness in organisational 
controls.  
Trust needs to include clear lines of responsibility and accountability to 
be effective along with agreements on how to deal with issues when 
they arise. 
Building trust is a fragile business and needs to be handled with due 
care and diligence because a failure may affect organisations internally 
and externally and trust is very difficult to regain once it is lost. 
The author concludes, that trust is difficult to establish and maintain in 
these relationships and needs to be treated with care and thought. 
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4 Computer Security Landscape 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the current situation surrounding computer 
security.  In particular, what Government is doing to protect citizens, 
what challenges businesses face and how they are addressing the 
issues.  
 
It also looks at some of the issues organisations face from the constant 
internet connection used by the employees including insider threats, e-
crime, de-perimeterisation, software testing and development, 
recommended security controls and the legal framework available for 
addressing technology related crimes. 
4.2 Changes in the Computer Security Landscape 
 
4.2.1 Always Connected 
 
Computers have become part of our everyday lives, from using them 
for keeping in touch with family and friends to selling goods on the 
internet.  Whilst a home user may live without the use of a computer for 
while, businesses on the other hand reply on it for their survival.  A 
business uses computers in its processes and serving its customers. 
Any disruption could cost an estimated £80K to £130K for large 
businesses and around £8k-15k for small businesses [17].  A 2008 
survey by BERR, found “84% of companies relied heavily dependent 
on IT systems” and of those surveyed, “77% saw protecting customer 
data as very important” [17]. 
Governments and business see information as the key to economic 
and business success therefore ensuring measures are put in place to 
encourage and facilitate that strategy. 
 
There are the usual data loss stories in the press [25], [26] ,[32] which 
bring this to the attention of the public and makes the public worry 
where their data is kept, who is protecting it and if they will become the 
victim of an e-crime such as identity theft. This current trend is set to 
continue according to the SANS top 10 trends [68]. These loses affect 
an organisations reputation and standing in a competitive market place. 
 
Computers and information systems are not only targeted by criminals 
[31] and insiders [30] but also vulnerable from malicious code such as 
viruses, trojans, spyware and program flaws [32] including buffer 
overflows [34].  Secure coding practices [35] can help but they will not 
cure all the problems. 
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Given this and the belief that 34 million computers are installed with 
fake software [33],[32], it is no wonder that companies are seeking new 
ways to combat these problems before they become at risk of going out 
of business 
4.2.2 The Insider Threat 
 
The internet and the continued drive for better, faster, cheaper products 
and services has seen an explosion of companies (six out of seven 
large companies off shoring IT operations [17]) looking for better ways 
of managing business operation leading to insider threats from internal 
employees and partner employees based within the same physical 
location . 
 
Businesses are deploying a range of tools and technologies such as 
database security products, personal firewalls, patch management 
systems, host intrusion prevention systems, endpoint data protection 
and desktop encryption to protect against insider and outsider threats 
as outlined in [30].  
 
In the authors view, these tools cannot always be effective in 
prevention or detection by automated tools with reliance on signatures 
and behaviors. The logs generated daily by technical controls are very 
large. In addition, skills for analysis are stretched with analysts not 
having enough time to review all alerts because they have to deal with 
operational issues 
 
An extract from the 2007 E-Crime Watch Survey [16] is provided below: 
 
“It is important that organisations are proactive in their approach to 
mitigating insider threats,” says Dawn Cappelli, Senior Member of the 
Technical Staff at CERT. “Defense in depth isn’t just about putting 
adequate technology in place, it’s also about paying attention to your 
people and implementing policies and procedures to reduce the 
likelihood of an insider attack. Our research has shown that those very 
policies and practices that respondents are cutting back on are critical 
in mitigating insider threats.” 
 
This is further compounded with the knowledge that roughly the same 
numbers (insiders 34%, outsiders 37% [16]) are involved in e-crime 
however emphasis is still more focused on the outsider. This may be as 
the author suggests attributed to political and human resource 
management considerations i.e. one does not want to upset the 
workforce by accusing them of potential wrong doing. The 2007 E-
Crime Watch Survey suggests 58% [16] of businesses are reliant on 
good policies covering employee terms and conditions in tackling 
insider crime but will this be effective in the long term as staff turnover 
increases? The author suggests that loyalty, contracted staff and short 
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contracts make this method of control via policies ineffective as there is 
no incentives for a staff member follow them. 
 
Insiders have access to local disks, USB drives, email, instant 
messaging and other mobile devices. Given that 36% of information 
theft is carried on mobile devices [16]; we can say this trend will 
continue at the current levels or even increase given the current state 
of employment practices.  
The author also suggests, from a business perspective employee’s 
could be targeted by competitors for their access to data and 
knowledge of a business. 
This breeds the environment of insider attacks and develops motivation 
for the information security breaches and intellectual property theft. 
 
4.2.3 E-Crime 
 
The government is a large user of information systems as discussed in 
the data sharing chapter and clearly understands the risks posed by 
new business models; it too has been busy putting measures into place 
to protect national interests [61]  
 
For example, the public are fully aware of internet card fraud... In 2008, 
it was reported £328m was lost from non card transactions 
Extract from the article [61] “Britons face a growing online threat from 
criminals, terrorists and hostile states, according to the UK's first cyber 
security strategy” 
Gordon Brown, – UK Prime Minister, wants the UK to lead the way on 
digital technologies and he wants every household to be connected to 
the internet.  But he is aware that criminals will seek to exploit these 
situations that   have currently amassed a £50bn industry and using it 
for organised crimes and terrorist’s activities. 
 
In light of this concern, the UK Governments is recognising the threats 
and opportunities that could affect the UK economy and now setup e-
crime strategies [17] across the UK as well as national critical 
infrastructure protection programmes. 
 
The Serious Organised Crime Agency [19] and the Home Office 
understand old crimes are being committed in new ways by criminals 
across all sectors and have led to the creation of an e-crime strategy 
[28].  
 
With all these initiatives, the question is will they be effective? Initiatives 
need to be coordinated to be effective in tackling electronic crime. For 
example, information must be shared between groups in a sensitive 
manner taking into account individual privacy concerns. Any 
enforcement action needs to be measured and not sensationalised in 
the press.  
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There needs to collaboration to fight other forms of e-crime such as 
intellectual property theft and copyright etc. 
The author also suggests assistance should be given to private 
companies in dealing with e-crimes as most of them are dealing with it 
internally (66% [16]). But they may not be following good practice or the 
correct legal framework which could open themselves up for litigation 
from employees or partners. According to 2007 E-Crime Watch Survey 
[16] 34% of them said they did not have enough evidence. Are they 
following correct evidence collection procedures?  
For example, what steps would a business need to follow in the event 
an employee downloading inappropriate content or copyrighted 
material claiming their account was compromised? 
A framework for processing these types of events would be useful 
suggests the author.  
 
The author believes this highlights a greater issue around the lack of 
forensics expertise in businesses. This has to be addressed going 
forward, especially in large businesses where there are globally diverse 
operations and requirement is greater. 
 
Forrester [60] suggests malicious code is on the decline and security 
directors have failed to adapt and still focus on viruses, worms and spy 
ware. The author disagrees as there are continual malicious code 
events being generated as reported [16].  The reason maybe related to 
the ineffective detection methods hence the security directors have not 
changed their focus. One can argue that security directors have 
become more reliant on technology due to resource pressures. One 
can also argue, the perceived outsider threat is more then the insider 
threat which would be at odds with the deployment of data loss 
protection tools. 
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4.2.4 De-perimeterisation 
 
The emergence of new business models is driving the adoption of a de-
perimeterisation business infrastructure where traditional controls 
compliment new controls on the data as advocated by the Jericho 
Forum [29]. 
  
The author suggests, there is a shift from perimeter security controls to 
more localised controls on the data itself; however, existing controls will 
remain in place for the foreseeable time. 
New type of controls such as data security products (protecting 
databases), application firewalls (protecting applications) and more 
general end point protection products are being deployed to protect 
data in use and at rest. 
However, this raises two issues with this new approach. Firstly, security 
directors are not getting enough funding and resources to enable this 
new of model working with appropriate staffing and tools. This in turn 
leads to stretched resources with the business benefiting from de-
perimeterisation but not the considering the costs for the added 
flexibility. 
4.2.5 Software Development and Testing 
Software development has been trying to address errors in 
programmatic code by programmers but little progress has been made. 
SANS highlights its top 10 coding errors [67] which led to the need to 
have systems patched on a regular basis. These errors can be used as 
a mechanism for exploiting systems. Once again, the author would like 
to highlight these errors types have been around for years which leads 
to asking the question. Why? 
One explanation is that programs are filled with thousands of lines of 
code along with lack of security awareness amongst developers, lack 
of quality checks and pressure to develop products faster and faster. 
So developers cannot be expected to know every usage of a piece of 
code, however training courses have emerged to help educate 
developers. 
4.2.6 Security controls 
 
The current level of crime inside and outside a business is not on the 
decline. What controls should be deployed? The author refers to SANS 
a respected security organisation, has recommended their 20 controls 
(these include controls relating network, platform and software 
vulnerabilities) which should be implemented to mitigate risks [67]. The 
author notes that we have not come very far as 18 of the 
recommended controls have been round for a sometime except Data 
Loss Protection and Application firewalls. This conveys the idea that 
organisations are protecting data and their web applications from harm. 
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These controls rely on signatures and behavioral type controls which 
could be circumvented by a skilled attacker or be missed by an 
inexperienced analyst, so training is important. 
4.2.7 Legislation  
 
The emergence of criminal activity also saw the emergence of three 
acts to give the courts more powers to deal with such offences. These 
acts are the Computer Misuse Act 1990 [62], Data Protection Act [63] 
and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (1990) [64]. This means 
law enforcement now have a tools to deal with computer crimes 
although it must be noted these are complimentary to other laws such 
as i.e. copyright  laws, fraud act, theft act, obscene publications act. 
Although computer crimes laws can be applied to cases, it does not 
mean other laws cannot be applied. On occasions an existing law can 
be applied to bring a prosecution. However, as mentioned earlier, 
evidence must be collected in an appropriate manner to be admissible. 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
The security landscape has changed over the last few years as 
businesses look for new innovative ways of working. Threats can arise 
from insider or outsiders; in fact the differential between the two is 
small.  
Organisations are engaging in collaborations across open networks like 
the internet which also has its threats. As a result, the controls 
landscape is changing from perimeter controls (de-perimeterisation) to 
more local controls on the data allowing many connections to the data 
to facilitate digital business networks and outsourcing. 
Organisations are very aware of insider threats in these seamless 
models of business connectivity, so started to deploy all kinds of 
controls and placing reliance on automated tools for log management 
and intruder detection. Automation tools are not optimal suggests the 
author because attacks are only measured against known attacks or 
signatures / behavioral patterns. 
To address insider threats from employees, organisations are using 
employment contract policies as a preventive measure to encourage 
staff not to engage in acts against the organisation.  
Errors in software have not stopped despite awareness of the security 
flaws in programming practices. Some organisations have started to 
develop secure coding training courses to reduce the number of errors 
leading to security vulnerabilities.  
Governments have recognised the threats to the public from e-crime 
and have setup a number of initiatives to compliment current laws in 
fighting e-crime. 
Private businesses not having the resources of the Government but 
could do with assistance and support in developing forensics skills to 
aid appropriate handling of e-crimes within an organisation. 
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5 Trusted Computing 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of trusted computing and the 
components of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as well as outlining 
why the TPM can be trusted.  A model for B2B data exchange using 
trusted computing technology will be presented with an explanation of 
how trusted computing can help reduce risk.  This will aid the reader in 
understanding this study and set context for the ensuing risk 
assessment. 
 
5.2 Trusted Computing and it’s Benefits 
 
Graeme Proudler [39] outlines that it is safe to trust something when: 
 
• (it can be unambiguously identified) 
• and (it operates unhindered) 
• and ( [the user has first hand experience of consistent, good, 
behavior] or [the user trusts someone who has provided 
evidence / references for consistent, good, behavior]) 
 
Trusted Computing refers to a computer system for which an entity has 
some level of assurance that (part of or all of) the computer system is 
behaving as expected [39].  This is implemented by using the services 
of a hardware component (chip) called a Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) which measures the software components on a computing 
platform using a range of cryptographic services. 
 
The original specification for the TPM was developed by the Trusted 
Computing Platform Alliance as outlined by Pearson [36], the current 
specification for the TPM is being developed and maintained by the 
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [37] whose members include major 
vendors in the computing technology market driving its adoption 
including Microsoft, Intel, HP, IBM, Sun  Microsystems as well as 
others [38].  The goal is to improve trustworthiness on information 
systems including PC, Laptops, servers, networks, mobile and storage 
systems. 
 
Trusted computing benefits include (as presented on the TCG website): 
 
• Protect Business Critical Data and Systems  
• Secure Authentication and Strong Protection of User IDs  
• Establish Strong Machine Identity and Integrity  
• Ensure Regulatory Compliance with Hardware-Based Security  
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• Reduce Total Cost of Ownership Through "Built In" Protection 
 
The TPM chip is included on the motherboard of a platform along with 
the BIOS to form what is called the Root of Trust for all trusted 
functionality.   
5.3 Overview of the Trusted Platform Module 
 
This section sets out a simplified explanation of the services provided 
by a TPM within a Trusted Platform, and aims to support the discussion 
set out in the paper.  For a detailed explanation of Trusted Computing 
refer Mitchell [11], Pearson [8], Challener [12], Eimear Gallery [39] – 
chapter 3. 
  
A TPM has three critical functions called Roots of Trust which must 
behave as expected because their misbehavior cannot be detected and 
therefore these form the foundation and constant for the solution. 
 
The Roots of Trust are embedded within the TPM and are responsible 
for reporting, gathering and storage of evidence about the 
trustworthiness of the platform software environment, and therefore 
must be trusted otherwise the whole TPM creditability and assurance in 
its measurements are not possible.  These roots are explained below 
along with other TPM components relevant to this paper. 
 
5.3.1 Key Functions of a TPM 
 
This section introduces the key functions of a TPM which include: 
 
• Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CTRM) 
• Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) 
• Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) 
• Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) 
• Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) 
• Endorsement Key Pair (EK) 
• Storage Root Keys (SRK) 
• Attestation Identity Keys (AIK) 
• Binding 
• Sealing 
• Migrateable Keys 
• Non-Migratable  Keys 
 
 
Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) 
This starts the boot process. This code is contained in the BIOS Boot 
Block and measures itself and the BIOS then stores the values into a 
PCR before passing control to the next piece of code. 
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Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) 
This is trusted to make reliable integrity measurement of software / 
firmware after a platform reset (maybe a partition as in a virtual 
machine or the platform itself i.e. a power cycle). 
  
Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) 
This is trusted to store integrity measurement recorded by the RTM into 
the Platform Configuration Registers (PCR). 
 
Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) 
This is trusted to report the integrity metrics to a third party requesting 
to know the platform state / PCR values stored by the RTS, along with 
a log of the components on a platform.  This log is referred to as the 
Stored Measurement log (SML) and stored outside of the TPM. 
 
Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) 
The registers inside the TPM are used to store integrity metrics 
provided by the RTM (20 bytes of data per register).  These metrics are 
essentially hashed measurements of software components on a trusted 
platform.  This is a critical function. 
 
Endorsement Key Pair (EK) 
This is unique for every TPM and serves the requirement - “it can be 
unambiguously identified “.  This key pair is only used for encryption / 
decryption purposes and is critical in the creation of Attestation Identity 
Keys (AIK).  The Private Key never leaves the TPM or revealed outside 
the TPM.  This key pair is generated by the TPM manufacturer in 
commercial platforms. 
 
Storage Root Keys (SRK) 
This key is created when a TPM ownership process is invoked which 
requires physical presence and is separate from the EK.  This key is 
used to protect other keys in the created by the TPM.  
Physical presence is required when taking ownership of a TPM.  It is a 
measure to stop rouge software taking ownership of a TPM by remote 
means.  This key is used to protect other keys generated by the TPM.  
 
Attestation Identity Keys (AIK) 
These are identity key pairs created for different purposes and attest to 
belonging to a TPM but do not give away any TPM details.  This is 
carried out using a Privacy Certificate Authority (P-CA) who signs the 
public key of an AIK after confirming the AIK came from a genuine TPM 
by verifying a series of TPM credentials. 
 
Binding 
By using a TPM Bind key, external data can be encrypted such that it 
can only be decrypted by another TPM with specific authorisation data. 
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Sealing 
Sealing is a process of encrypting data to specific TPM PCR 
measurements.  Conditions can be set so that the encrypted data 
cannot be decrypted unless those specific PCR measurements are 
present, i.e. the platform has to be in a particular configuration state. 
 
Migrateable Keys 
Migrateable Keys can be migrated away from a TPM assuming the 
correct authorisation data is available.  This allows keys to be stored in 
a different location for safe keeping. 
 
Non-Migratable Keys 
Non-Migratable Keys cannot be migrated away from the TPM.  An 
example could be the private endorsement key of the EK.  
 
The are other components within the TPM such as I/O; Non-Volatile 
(NV) storage; Random Number generator;  Opt-in, RSA Engine, SHA-1 
Engine, Execution Engine and Key generation capabilities which are 
used to provide TPM services including the Roots of Trust.  
 
5.3.2 The Authenticated Boot Process 
 
The importance of the Root of Trust concept is critical to Trusted 
Computing and can be better understood during the authenticated boot 
process. 
Figure 2 outlines the information flow and integrity measurement during 
an authenticated boot up of a platform containing a TPM.  It shows how 
measurements are conducted and stored using a cryptographic hash 
function. 
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 Figure 2: Authenticated Boot Process. 
 Source derived from: Royal Holloway - Trusted Computing Lecture 
 Notes 
 
In a PC, where the Core Root to Trust Module (CRTM) may be 
integrated into the part of the BIOS called the BIOS boot block (BBB), 
integrity metrics may be measured and recorded as follows: 
 
• The BBB (the CRTM) starts the boot process, measures its own 
integrity and the integrity of the entire BIOS, and stores the 
details of the measured components in the Stored Measurement 
Log (SML), saving the integrity measurements (hash values of 
the component measured) in a TPM Platform Configuration 
Register (PCR); 
 
• The BBB then passes control to the BIOS, which contains a 
Measurement Agent (MA) responsible for measuring the option 
ROMs, storing the details of the measured components in the 
SML and the integrity measurements in a TPM PCR; 
 
• Control is then passed from the BIOS to the option ROMs, which 
carry out their normal operations and pass control back to the 
BIOS; 
 
• The BIOS then measures the OS Loader, and stores the details 
of the measured component in the SML and the integrity 
measurement in a TPM PCR; 
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• Control is then passed to the OS loader, also containing an 
integrated MA, which carries out its normal functions and then 
measures the OS, stores the details of the measured component 
in the SML and the integrity measurements in a TPM PCR; 
 
• Finally, control is passed to the OS. 
 
The authenticated boot process ensures all components are measured 
and kept in PCR’s so these measurements can be provided to a third 
party when requested.  PCR values for software present on the system 
will also be recorded and released to third parties upon request.  The 
third party then has assurance that only software outlined in the SML 
and PCR are present on a system and not some other code. 
 
5.3.3 Isolated Operating Environment 
 
Trusted Computing using a TPM allows for the operation of an isolated 
operating environment which can sit inside a host and process data 
without being affected by the remaining platform.   
 
For example, a virtual machine running one application can be created 
purely for processing data and be protected from other environments 
physically on the same machine.  These environments use the latest 
processor extensions to facilitate their operation.  Integrity 
measurements stored in the PCR can be provided to a remote 
challenger for verification. 
 
5.4 Why should a TPM be Trusted? 
 
A TPM is manufactured in controlled and secure environments by 
manufacturers with strong brands to protect.  The TPM is a security 
chip produced and distributed as something which should be trusted.  
Any adverse publicity would damage brands, present legal issues as 
well as affecting their reputations as businesses.  The Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG) has developed a number of signed 
credentials and outlined a deployment process for all TPM 
manufactured to their specifications.  In particular, there four 
credentials that vouch for the trustworthiness of a TPM: 
 
1. Trusted Platform Module Entity (TPME) – This is usually the 
manufacturer of the TPM who signs the public key of the EK to 
confirm the TPM is genuine. 
 
2. Conformance Credential (CE) – Guarantees the Trusted 
Platform design and the design of the TPM conforms to the TCG 
specifications. 
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3. Platform Entity (PE) – Gives assurances that a particular 
platform is an instantiation of a Trusted Platform design as 
described in the conformance credential and the platforms TPM 
is genuine. This is usually the original equipment manufacturer. 
 
4. Validation Entity (VE) – Certifies integrity measurements of 
embedded data or code such that a challenger can use the 
measurements as means of validation of the programmes or 
data. 
  
5.5 Establishing Trust on a Remote Host 
 
This paper is concerned with data confidentially and integrity within 
B2B data processing relationship.  The service user needs to be sure 
the remote partner is operating an environment which is approved by 
the service user.  There is a need to obtain an integrity report which 
can be verified against known integrity measurements provided by a 
Validation Entity. 
 
Figure 3 below outlines the communication exchange between two 
parties establishing a data processing relationship.  The service user 
seeks to confirm that the service provider is using a specific 
configuration before sending any data for processing. 
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Service User / Verifer/
Challenger on a Trusted
Platform
Local or Remote client wants
to establish integrity of
partners data processing
environment before sending
data for processing.
Data will be sealed / Bound
to a particular platform
integrity measurement
Service Provider processing
data for service user.
Using a Trusted platform with
agreement with service user
to process data only under
strict integrity measurement
and access control.
The Provided will be sealed /
bound to a particular integrity
measurement
Please send todays data
for processing
Please provide Integrity
measures for your Trusted
Platform
The RTR sends the
Integrity report of the
platform
The service user
compares what was
provided by the service
provider against what is
supplied by the validation
Entity of the hardware /
software of the providers
platform. The service user
also compares PCR
values to ensure bound or
sealed data is only
released under specific
PCR conditions.
Sealed / Bound data
package sent to service
provider
Data is decrypted and
processed before being
encrypted and sent back -
once again sealed / bound
to the service user
Figure 3: Communication exchanges in B2B data processing using Trusted 
Computing 
 
The exchanges illustrated in Figure 3 can occur locally inside an 
internal network or over communication lines using secure protocols 
over open networks such as the internet via SSL/TLS making it widely 
applicable. 
 
5.6 How does Trusted Computing Help 
 
Many organisations including pharmaceuticals businesses, heath 
departments, hospitals, Governments often want to restrict or keep 
secret information from employees, competitors and Partners 
depending on the circumstances.  However data can leak any numbers 
of ways including by removal media, email, taking screen grabs etc. 
 
As an example, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
(HIPAA) regulation makes it an offence to release medical records to 
an unauthorised person [13].  
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In a business to business data processing Partnering relationship, 
using trusted computing technologies an environment can be created 
on the partner site or internally locking the data to a particular platform 
state and even then only allow restricted access to the processing 
application.  
 
Other applications of Trusted Computing include OS functions where 
unauthorised users would not be allowed to access data whilst the data 
is processed in the decrypted form.  This would be achieved by the use 
of secure drivers which for example may not allow copying of memory 
locations to another location i.e. cut & paste in Windows.  This however 
does not protect against somebody taking pictures of data from the 
screen using a mobile phone with a camera.  
 
Trusted Computing allows for the creation of secure environments 
where the data owner sets pre-conditions as when and how their data 
will be accessed and by whom. 
 
Having this level of control is clearly powerful and reduces if not 
eliminates activity as a result of malicious code, viruses, Trojans, bad 
applications, buffer overflows, basically vulnerabilities introduced by 
software mechanisms.  The assumption is that the trusted software is 
free from bugs too.  However, as the trusted software is expected to be 
small and specific in its function, it can be can validated by external 
parties or the validation entity.  This is not the case for current 
commercial operating systems or software because of the size of the 
programs and vast array of functions. 
 
5.7 Challenges to the Adoption of Trusted Computing 
 
The author suggests there are many challenges to the wide 
spreadsheet adoption of Trusted Computing with the TPM.  These 
challenges include. 
 
• The TPM is a heavy user of public key cryptography and would 
need a robust Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with all the 
associated challenges of deployment for using a TPM 
manufacturing and supply [64]. 
 
• The TPM relies very much on PCR configuration information 
relating to software which is on a platform.  Currently there are 
no reliable mechanisms which can be deployed with a common 
standard to make such measurements. 
 
For example frequent patching will change PCR values and 
make attestation very difficult, not forgetting the unsealing of 
locked data.  If a PCR value changed then all data locked data 
to that TPM with a non-migrateable key would be lost. 
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• Currently the Trusted Platforms do not come with a CRTM or the 
relevant conformance information which a user can build 
confidence upon.  This makes it difficult to validate that a TPM is 
genuine. 
 
• TPM are being deployed on laptops and desktops but not 
currently on servers which are where a corporate audience 
could utilise it form B2B applications.  
 
The author suggests this is a critical area for further work as 
servers generally hold the critical data in a corporate 
environment and are attacked from remote locations.  This will 
happen more as businesses move towards the de-
perimeterisation as advocated by the Jericho forum.  
 
• TPM has a very limited number of commercial applications 
which take advantage of its services currently.  Until 
manufacturers issue, credible conformance credentials, take up 
will be low. The author suggests few software vendors are 
looking to use the technology due to lack of market opportunity. 
 
• Limited software development expertise is a constraint as is little 
knowledge amongst developers on how to build applications 
using TPM technology resulting in few applications exploiting the 
technology. 
 
• The author believes that the public would be against the idea of 
using Trusted Computing because of the fear of being tracked 
by their computer usage, although people can be tracked by law 
enforcement and cookies already. 
 
• The management overhead associated with TPM may prohibit 
take-up. For example, additional processes will be required to 
manage TPM failure, the safe protection of keys, ensuring TPM 
was used correctly by employee, releasing of data when 
employee leave a business, etc. 
 
• TPM fundamentally requires two parties to operate using pre-
agreed software stacks, which may mandate organisations use 
specific software to maintain conformance i.e. parties are locked 
into using specific software vendor. 
 
• With the popular use of virtualisation (multiple virtual machines 
on a single platform), for TPM to work in this context, there is a 
need for more mature isolation technology from microprocessor 
manufacturers.  This isolation technology has not left the lab 
with its full feature set as promised by processor manufacturers 
and is not ready for commercial use. 
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Other concerns relate to backward compatibility with TPM already 
released; development of open source software and commercial 
incentives for certification authorities to enter into the market. 
 
5.8 Summary 
 
 
Trusted Computing with TPM offers a great advancement in platform 
security if all of the features are established. It offers platform security 
against software based attacks from malicious code, Trojans, viruses, 
root kits as well as providing platform configuration information when 
requested.  Its strength resides in its ability to measure components on 
a platform in a manner which cannot be circumvented by code running 
without the knowledge of the core root of trust supported by the CRTM, 
RTM, RTS, RTR and PCR. 
The main reliance is on the measurements carried out and storage 
provided by the platform configuration registers during the 
authenticated boot process. 
The TPM also offers a range of Cryptographic services used for 
generating identities; secure key storage, random number generation, 
symmetric and asymmetric services etc.  
A trusted platform is trusted to behave as expected because its 
misbehaviour cannot be detected by any other components i.e. its core 
trust measurements are expected to be carried out and provide a 
genuine attestation of its configuration otherwise it cannot be trusted. 
Reliance is placed on these measurements by other TPM services 
such as sealing and binding. 
Software running on a trusted platform is expected to be verified by a 
validation entity which vouches for the cryptographic value of the code 
and has the ability to be measured by a management agent so that its 
hash value can be recorded into a PCR. 
The report B2B environment for data sharing relied on remote 
attestation which connects to a remote host and requests it’s 
configuration information before any data is sent for processing. This 
ability assured the service user the platform at a partner site was 
indeed running a secure configuration and it was safe for data to be 
sent for processing. 
 
Although trusted computing offers a great step forward, it does have it 
draw backs on implementation and acceptance. 
To be fully integrated commercially, it requires the use of public key 
infrastructure and associated services of certification authorities for the 
various credentials for the TPM and associated identities it generates. 
Currently there are no such certification authorities to facilitate wide 
spread adaptation of the TPM. 
TPM are currently only deployed onto desktop and laptop machines 
systems only, the author suggests the key area where a TPM needs to 
be deployed is on servers where organisations process and store their 
critical data. 
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Other issues include the lack of software with appropriate 
measurement agents and associated validation entities. As a result, 
there are few applications available which are able to use the TPM 
functionality. This maybe due to the lack of developer expertise too and 
generally knowledge is not widespread. 
 
The TPM usage in the study relied on Microprocessor based isolation 
technology which is currently not available from CPU manufacturers. 
This again is still in the lab and not fully realised. 
 
There are other issues too, including changes in PCR values due to 
patching; software changes and the lack of a CRTM on current 
processor boards. 
 
It also has its objectors mainly due to privacy concerns because there 
is a view that users will be tracked and also software lock in concerns 
because vendors may require customers to use particular software.   
 
 The authors view is that the technology is not mature enough to be 
 used in commercial environments where stability and low management 
 overhead is important. 
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6 Impact of TPM on Organisational Risk  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The impact of introducing Trusted Platform Module (TPM) into a 
business to business data sharing environment is considered in this 
chapter.  The approach to understand this impact is via a comparison 
of the risk profile before and after the introduction of TPM. 
 
This chapter starts by providing an overview of the risk assessment 
methodology employed based on BS ISO 27005:2008 [46c].  Critically 
it also highlights the scope of the assessment to ensure a fair and 
balanced approach.  To ensure an unbiased comparison by drawing 
information on information from different sources including SANS 
Institute (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security, established in 1989 as a 
cooperative research and educational organisation which also runs 
security courses globally.  It is a not-for-profit organisation and is well 
respected within industry).   The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the findings. 
 
6.2 Risk Management Methodology 
 
A risk as defined by the Management of Risk used in UK government 
departments as “an uncertain event or set of events which could, 
should they occur, will have an effect on the achievement of objectives” 
[45].  The risk management methodology described below summarises 
the steps involved in identifying the risks, quantifying their impacts 
using industry specific information and evaluating the approach to 
treatment. 
6.2.1 The Method 
 
The method employed here is to develop the risk profiles based on 
BS27005:2008 [46].  Figure 4 below illustrates the risk management 
process used in BS ISO / IEC 27005:2008 to establish an Information 
Security Management System (ISMS). 
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  Figure 4:  Information Security Risk Management Process 
 Source: BS ISO/IEC 27005:2008 
 
Put simply, the method requires the context be defined (Context 
Established) and for the purposes of this paper is data sharing between 
businesses in the pharmaceutical industry as set out in previous 
chapters.  Within this context, risks are identified (Risk Identification), 
i.e. what problems could come about that would compromise the 
business.  Once the lists of risks are understood, estimates of their 
likelihood and possible impact are determined (Risk Estimation).   
Depending on the likelihood and possible impact, risks are evaluated 
(Risk Evaluation) to develop appropriate controls in response.  The 
approach with each stage is described in more detail in the following 
subsections. 
 
The overall process being used is well documented in [46c], however 
as this study is an evaluation of assurance.  The author has limited the 
scope to Context Establishment, Risk Identification, Risk Estimation 
and Risk Evaluation and did not consider other elements included in 
the guidance [46c] such as Risk Monitoring and Review, Risk 
Communication, Risk Treatment and Risk Acceptance as the intention 
is not to establish as Information Security Management System. 
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6.2.2 Statement of Applicability 
 
BS ISO/IEC 27005:2008 sets out eight types of threats as shown in the 
left of Figure 5 below and illustrates how the selection of the four high 
level risks was derived from this list of eight high level risk areas 
outlined in the standard. 
 
 
Figure 5: illustration of how the “Statement of Applicability” was used to 
select risks for this evaluation  
 
A number of these risk types are related to major catastrophes or ‘force 
majeure’, where the presence of TPM will have little or no impact on 
the outcome.  The likelihood of these events are also low or very low 
albeit the impacts are high or very high and therefore these risk types 
have been excluded from the scope of applicability, i.e. Physical 
Damage, Natural Events, Loss of Essential Services and Disturbance 
due to Radiation.  
The high level statement of applicability will include the following risk 
areas: 
 
1. Compromise of Information; 
 
2. Technical Failures; 
 
3. Unauthorised Actions; 
  
4. Compromise of Functions. 
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6.2.3 Risk Identification and Estimation  
 
The risk types in the Statement of Applicability were expanded further 
into typical threats and risks as outlined in the 2007 e-Crime Survey 
[16], BS ISO/IEC 27005:2008 [46a] and the SANS Top 20 
Programming errors [70].  
 
The risks identified were used to build the risk register.  This method 
was used by the author to establish a linkage between actual risks 
identified in practice as outlined in 2007 e-Crime survey [16], known 
established problems contributing to risks as outlined by SANS and the 
best practice risk considerations given in BS ISO/IEC 27005:2008.  
This can be seen in figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Steps in Identifying Risks 
 
For the purposes of this evaluation of TPM, it is important that a fair 
sample of risks is considered to ensure an unbiased result.   
 
These risks were recorded in the risk register taking guidance from 
industry best practice, specifically 2007 e-crime surveys [16] , BS 
ISO/IEC 27005:2008[46a] and SANS top 20 Programming errors [70]. 
 
The reason behind this two step approach by the author was to capture 
the areas where e-crime is most active and extract the most common 
risks associated with business to business transactions. 
To score the risks, source materials [16], [70], [46c], Appendix A – 
Impact and Likelihood Matrix and Appendix B – Risk Impact Definitions 
were used.  The impact and likelihood matrix and the risk impact 
Compromise 
 Of information 
2007 e-Crime Survey [16],  
BS ISO/IEC 27005:2008 [46a] 
 SANS Top 20 Programming errors [70]  
Risks to consider within 
The Statement of Applicability 
Technical 
Failures 
Unauthorized 
 Actions 
Compromise 
 Of functions 
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definitions set out the scoring scheme used to quantify likelihood and 
impact and aid in comparison between the two risk profiles.  Both 
likelihood and impact have linear scoring which are multiplied to give a 
combined risk score. 
 
An estimation of the likelihood and impacts is offered within the risk 
assessment.  The important consideration here is the relative 
difference between the likelihood and impact before and after the 
introduction of TPM. 
 
6.2.4 Risk Evaluation 
 
The risk assessment evaluation firstly considers the controls that are 
typically employed as part of a risk treatment plan BS ISO/IEC 
27005:2008 and other industry good practice i.e. SANS Top 20 
Controls [67] to mitigate the identified risks.  
 
This is followed up with an evaluation of how TPM can also mitigate 
these risks.  The resulting two risk profiles are compared and the 
findings are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
6.3 Risk Assessments:  Without and With TPM 
 
The risk register for the threats associated with the risk types identified 
within the statement of applicability and appropriate controls is included 
in Appendix C – Baseline Risk Register without TPM Controls.  For the 
purposes of this evaluation, this register is used as the baseline from 
which a comparison is made.  It should also be noted that this 
evaluation focuses on the security of the platform. 
 
The risk register for the threats associated with the risk types identified 
within the statement of applicability and appropriate controls (including 
TPM controls) is included in. Appendix D – Risk Register with TPM 
Controls.  It should be noted that TPM controls are taken into 
consideration as part of the assessment as well as layering on top of 
the SANS Top 20 controls. 
 
The risks addressed by trusted computing are related to platforms and 
not network connectivity and it is assumed parties would use data 
sharing via dedicated network links. However, there is a stream of 
trusted computing which can be applied to secure network connectivity 
know as Trusted Network Connect (TNC). 
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6.4 Comparison of Risk Profile and Findings 
 
Trusted Computing controls do reduce the overall risk profile.  Table 5 
below highlights the level of risk reduction after the deployment of 
Trusted Computing controls when compared to the baseline risk 
register.  The Risk IDs refer back to the risk register and using the risk 
scoring scheme it can be seen that the risk levels reduce by between 
33% and 67% by using Trusted Computing. 
 
Risk ID's Risk Reduction 
2,3,6,7,18 67% 
15,16 50% 
1,4,5,14,19,20,21,22,23 33% 
8,9,10,11,12,13,17 0% 
    
   Table 5: Risk Reduction Table 
 
The TPM was most effective in reducing risk associated with 
Compromise of Information and Unauthorised Actions from the 
statement of applicability.  It was less effective on “Compromise of 
Functions” due to the nature of the activity on a platform.  Furthermore, 
it had no effect on preventing theft of media: theft of equipment or 
tampering of hardware which are related to physical attacks and made 
no difference. 
 
Below is a discussion of how trusted computing controls were used to 
reduce the current risks: 
 
1. Sealed / Bound Data 
TPM seals data to the platform, so any attempt to copy 
information from a Trusted Platform renders that data useless.  It 
can be argued, that is offers no more protection than encrypting 
the data. The difference is that the current encryption methods 
do not set state information which is a prerequisite for access 
with TPM.  This is reinforced by keys which may be non-
migrateable and so never leave the TPM and therefore render 
the data useless even if the data was copied off. 
 
This control prevents data loss and protection of data on mobile 
devices as well as preventing access to data by malicious 
software.  However, the author points out that if the TPM is 
damaged or inoperable then all data is lost unless there is a 
backup of keys which may not be the case in every event. 
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2. Platform Integrity using Platform Configuration Registers 
(PCR) 
These registers are critical in preventing and controlling access 
to data by users or programs.  If the platform is running an un-
validated piece of code or code is started on a system then the 
PCR registers values will defer from the conditions required to 
unseal the data, therefore the data will remain inaccessible and 
sealed. 
 
A known good configuration state provides assurance that 
malicious code, spyware, botnets, phishing attacks, backdoors 
and other hacking/malicious tools cannot be used to control the 
platform and gain access to the data.  This may be possible with 
existing arrangements as operators may surf the internet and 
potentially become infected with malicious code. 
 
Regulatory bodies like this kind of control because access to 
data is controlled and not allowed without specific conditions 
being met.  PCR were the most used control for reducing risk in 
the trusted computing risk assessment. 
 
3. Data Locked to Platform State 
This control is a combination of (1) and (2) above and prevents 
data copied off onto remote / mobile devices from being 
accessible outside of the platform.  This function could be used 
to offsite backups and prevent unauthorised access. If this 
offsite data was stolen, then it will be useless to a thief because 
the data is locked to a platform state. 
 
4. Software Integrity Checks 
This prevents malicious or compromised software being installed 
and run on a host.  The Validation Entity measurements would 
not match; therefore data would not be released for processing.  
This would prevent rogue software taking control of a host.  For 
example if a host was compromised as a result of vulnerability, 
the additional / changed code to compromise the host would 
change the integrity metrics. 
 
5. Isolated Processing Environment 
Using the TPM functions, an isolated environment can be 
implemented in which all data processing is carried out.  This 
would not be accessible from other environments on the 
computing platform and only selected services and access is 
provided to allow for data processing.  For example, the 
environment may not allow for any connections by mobile 
devices (memory sticks, USB drives etc) or allow the operator to 
run any other applications outside of what was required for data 
processing.  
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We can see from this risk assessment that using these measures 
improves host security protection by reducing the risk considerably.  
These measures give the businesses using the services, a higher level 
of confidence that their data is managed in a controlled environment, 
giving additional assurance outside of the regular business to business 
controls which rely on the third party Partner to behave in an expected 
manner. 
Trusted Computing is particularly useful for pharmaceuticals 
environments, in the authors view because some systems must be 
maintained to standards outlined by what is called “Good Regulatory 
Practice” or GxP for short.  The x is used to denote that good practices 
apply to different streams of drug development cycle, i.e. 
manufacturing, clinical trials etc. 
 
Currently, an entire system must be managed with appropriate 
documentation kept for inspection by the regulators.  This applies to 
software updates, patching, and physical hardware operations etc, 
basically anything which could be interpreted as affecting the integrity 
of the data stored on a system.  As the reader can imagine, this takes a 
long time and is an expensive task performed by experienced staff on 
the entire system. 
 
Trusted Computing would allow for GxP to be applied to the isolated 
data processing environment which has small number of applications 
installed and more importantly, all applications have an associated 
integrity measurement compared to an entire system which has a far 
greater number of applications and no integrity measurements. 
 
This allows for controlled auditable activity to take place in more 
manageable and isolated environment leading to lower risks and better 
assurance for the data. In the context of the risk assessment, this is an 
important point to note. 
 
For example, compliance checks can be made; particularly to 
demonstrate that information relating to drug trial was not modified or 
accessed by other parties affecting the integrity and confidentiality of 
data. 
 
Using trusted controls allows partners to establish from a remote 
location, the integrity of a platform before allowing data to be 
transferred as opposed to asking the partner if the environment is safe 
for the transfer of data. 
 
In the authors view, Trusted Computing is a great step forward for a 
number of reasons.  For example, data assurance would seem to be 
greater because the business has some control over the processing 
environments. Currently there is reliance and trust placed on the 
partner to behave in good manner against the fear of loosing business. 
The author argues, this is not always the case because the partner is 
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so interconnected with the business that contracts cannot be cancelled 
that easily. 
 
Trusted Computing brings a level of control against software based 
attacks because any software not behaving as expected would prevent 
processing of data by simply relying on PCR integrity check of the 
software. 
 
For example, non validated software cannot be used for information 
processing or used if the business does not mandate it.  Therefore 
businesses can be assured that Partners are not using non validated 
software in their environments. 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
 During this stage of the report, a risk assessment was performed 
 following the methodology outlined in BS27005:2008 drawing on 
 multiple sources to identify threats, risks and current e-crime activity 
 (SANS, BS27005:2008 and e-crime survey). 
 The context of the risk assessment was for a pharmaceutical 
 organisation which is processing sensitive competitive information after 
 identifying, evaluating and estimating the risk associated with B2B data 
 sharing. 
 The risk methodology was used to develop the statement of 
 applicability choosing the most appropriate risks from eight categories 
 down to four which were applicable to platform risks. 
 The four risk categories were: 
 
1. Compromise of information 
2. Technical failures 
3. Unauthorised actions 
4. Compromise of functions. 
 
 These categories were used to identify specific risks on which the two 
 rounds of risk assessment was carried out. 
 One round was using current controls recommended by SANS Institute 
 and another round assuming Trusted Computing controls were 
 implemented. 
 The risk evaluation against likelihood and impact were calculated and 
 recorded in the risk registers for each round. 
 The two risk registers were compared and analysed. The risk registers 
 suggested that the TPM did indeed reduce the risks associated with 
 B2B data sharing in a pharmaceutical organisation using Trusted 
 Computing by as much as 67%. The assessment highlighted the TPM 
 was most effective for compromise of information and unauthorised 
 actions. However, it was less effective on compromise of functions. 
  The TPM reduced the risks by using the following of its functions: 
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1. Sealing and bounding data to the TPM prevented data loss and 
rendering any data copied off useless to the attacker because it was 
locked to the platform and its configuration information. 
2. PCR helped to ensure no rouge software could compromise the data 
because the data was only released for processing under a particular 
platform state. PCR also helped with ensure only validated software 
was running on the platform. 
3. Isolated environment within the processing host helped ensure no 
connectivity from other possible hostile environments were possible. 
 
The TPM offered considerable risk reduction compared to current 
operating environments where data is processed giving high levels of 
confidence and data assurance to the business and the partner. The 
author also established that this kind of control would be very useful in 
GxP regulated environments where audit trails are of vital important to 
demonstrate data integrity. 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper aimed to explore data sharing between organisations and in 
particular data sharing between pharmaceutical organisations and their 
partners. 
 It explored the need to share data, how organisations can build trust 
 when sharing data and discussing some of the challenges. 
It explored the current security landscape and  some of the challenges 
facing information security today before  performing a risk assessment 
on platform security using Trusted Computing with a  Trusted Platform 
Module to establish if it will offer impressive levels of data  assurance 
and aide in the development of trust between  organisations. 
 
Organisations and governments are sharing data to facilitate new 
business to business operating models to maintain competitive 
advantage, maintain control over operating costs and deliver services. 
Global sourcing deals means data is shared across multiple 
geographies by relaxing existing security controls to allow applications 
and data processing environments to work in the new de-perimeterised 
seamless business models. 
This allows organisations to focus on core business activities. 
Pharmaceutical organisations share critical drug research information 
as well as business process information which is sensitive and valuable 
due to the time it takes for the information to be gathered and 
processed (sometimes up to 15 years). 
 
Pharmaceuticals and the government must follow the data protection 
act and the human rights act to maintain confidential information.  
Pharmaceuticals must also maintain regulatory control over data   by 
demonstrating compliance during a drug development cycle.  
The public is skeptical on the ability of the government or private 
companies in looking after their personal information and maintaining 
privacy given the number of breaches reported in the press. The 
government recently withdrew a data marking amendment to the justice 
bill after receiving pressure from  the  privacy groups. 
 
Data sharing is in existence and will continue to be but care is needed 
by all in the processing, collection and storage. 
Building trust in these business partnerships and entrusting a partner 
with some of the organisations critical competitive information is very 
difficult but necessary for the success of an organisation. Trust is a 
fundamental human requirement and is very fragile with serious 
consequences when it is lost. This is even more so in business 
relationships because it can have dramatic effect on public confidence, 
perception, brand loyalty and not forgetting the legal issues which may 
arise out of data breach i.e. confidential information is released into the 
public domain or data on individuals status of health becomes know in 
public 
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Organisations use a number of methods to develop trust including 
contracts, accreditations, audits, review of technical controls, 
interviews, site visits and inspections etc. 
One method in isolation does not offer a complete picture upon which 
to build trust. A collection of methods must be used to ensure trust 
established. 
 
Each method has its flaws relating to people, processes and 
technology. For example, contract responsibilities, accountabilities may 
be not being communicated across the partner organisations, audit 
may overlook key areas or lack scope and technical controls may not 
be managed correctly.   In the pharmaceutical environment these 
issues may lead to regulatory compliance problems with regulatory 
bodies holding organisations accountable for the problems of their 
partner.  
 
 Security management is further complicated by organisations need to 
 be constantly connected to the internet and  the partner networks 
 following de-perimeterisation principles , so any disruption affects 
 operations and costs money. 
 The threats from malicious code, viruses, trojans, and botnets are here 
 to stay because there has been no remarkable improvement in 
 protection or detection technology as attacks have become more 
 sophisticated. 
 
 New sourcing and business partnership models have given rise to 
 more motivation for insider and outsider attacks on organisations who 
 have responded by concentrating data protection at the end point i.e. 
 on the data itself. Once again this is important for pharmaceuticals 
 where data integrity and confidentiality must be demonstrated to 
 regulatory authorities.  
 The Government being a large sharer of data recognises the need for a 
 connected economy and realised the need to protect the public and its 
 infrastructure from criminals, hostile states and terrorist. The 
 Government has setup e-crime strategies across the UK and 
 internationally to tackle this growing threat. 
 
 The author suggests that as e-crime may take place within 
 organisations, help is needed to drive expertise and good practice in 
 computer forensics, 
 Data sharing is a essential for organisation which means e-crime will 
 always remain and unfortunately security controls have not changed 
 dramatically over recent years. This has left governments, individuals 
 and private organisations feeling vulnerable to attacks. This highlights 
 the need for effective security controls. Trusted Computing using a 
 Trusted Platform Module aims to offer this control by claiming it can 
 offer more platform security and data assurance.  
 
 To determine if this claim could be justified, two risk assessments were 
 performed and compared against the context of a pharmaceutical 
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 environment. One assessment assumed the TPM was in use whilst the 
 other did not. 
 The statement of applicability as outlined in BS 27005:2008 helped 
 identify the generic risk areas from eight risk types down to four risk 
 types. The risk types selected were Compromise of information; 
 Technical failures; Unauthorised Actions; Compromise of functions.  
To ensure the risks where selected in a fair and appropriate way, the 
author selected multiple sources to ensure practical real world risks 
and theoretical risks advocated by BS 27005:2008 were considered. 
The Industry recommended best practice controls were assumed to be 
in use against the selected risk types. 
 
A comparison was made between the two risk registers and it was 
found that TPM reduced the risks by 33% to 67% across most of the 
risks. The TPM was most effective on risks associated with 
“Compromise of information” and “Unauthorised actions” which is very 
applicable to pharmaceutical GxP regulated environments because 
these two types of risks can invalidate drug research information or trial 
data. Furthermore the risks could allow a regulator to halt business 
operations if compliance can not be demonstrated. 
 
The risk was reduced because the platform security had improved and 
there was no reliance on the partner’s controls or assurances regarding 
the platform as discussed in the challenges in managing trust. 
 
Trusted Computing specification developed by the Trusted Computing 
Group (TCG) is used within a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) whilst 
offering greater levels of data security and data assurance has a 
number of challenges. In the context of this report and data sharing in a 
pharmaceutical environment, the top challenges are: 
 
1. The lack of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which can be used 
 to build trust in the actual TPM itself i.e. a PKI which can be  
 used by TPM manufacturers, platform designers and platform 
 manufactures upon which the Pharmaceutical organisation can 
 build confidence that a TPM is genuine and conforms to TCG 
 specifications.  
2. TPM are not deployed on servers so applications used for data 
  processing cannot take advantage of TPM functionality. 
3. Lack of an agreed standard by which application validation can 
  take place or measurements provided by a validation entity so 
  PCR values can be referenced. 
4. The lack of a PKI for generation of identities but this may not be 
  such as an issue because that could be run internally by the  
  pharmaceutical organisation and its partner. 
5. There is little expertise in application development or   
  commercial drive in the developing applications which utilise  
  TPM functions. 
6. Virtual isolation technology has not matured to use TPM on  
  server platforms. 
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7. In a pharmaceutical environments or any business environment, 
  software patching is mandated to take place on a regular basis 
  so the PCR values would need to be managed between the  
  organisation and its partners which introduces complexities and 
  operational overhead. 
8. The TPM is a new technology and has not matured enough for 
  use in a corporate environment because there is little   
  understanding of what it would take to manage such an  
  infrastructure. 
 
 
This paper has met the initial objectives by outlining the need and drive 
to share data; the current security landscape; challenges for 
establishing trust and explored whether a TPM can offer greater levels 
of data assurance and platform security for a pharmaceutical 
organisation by way of a risk assessment. 
 
In summary, the findings are such that a TPM can offer better security 
and data assurance whilst offering more information towards building 
trust in a partnership but it is not yet a mature technology which can be 
used for data processing. 
 
This work has contributed to offering a risk based approach to 
confirming some of the accepted views in using TPM technology. It has 
also highlighted how the TPM offers another avenue in establishing 
trust between organisations because reliance is not solely placed on 
assurances from the partner that their environment is safe for data 
processing. 
The work has also agreed with some of the challenges faced by trusted 
computing and its wider adoption. It has also confirmed that “Trust” is a 
very difficult concept to pin down and requires technology, processes 
and above all people to make it work. 
 
The author concludes on a few suggestions as to where further work 
should be conducted for the adoption of Trusted Computing.  
The new ideas such as trusted computing will be another control for the 
management of information security but there needs to be more work 
carried out in the following areas: 
 
1. The development and acceptance of a PKI used in trusted  
  computing approved by law makers, so it has legal acceptance 
  on  areas such as liabilities and accountability 
2. Deployment of TPM onto servers needs higher priority from the 
  platform manufacturers and designers. 
3. Agreement on a mechanism for validating applications which 
  takes into account the security patching cycles in organisations. 
4. More awareness and training offered on TPM technology which 
  seems to be only in research establishments. 
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 The TPM opens the doors to an endless list of secure applications 
including Business to Business data sharing, Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) Applications, Secure Web Services, Digital 
Signatures, Secure P2P networks etc 
 
In the authors view, Trusted Computing offers a long awaited security 
control for platform security which if not handled correctly will become 
another technology which never leaves the research lab. At this time, 
the author cannot think of any other security technology with as much 
promise as Trusted Computing. 
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Appendix A – Impact and Likelihood Matrix 
 
  Impact 
  Very Low 
(1) 
Low (2) Medium 
(3) 
High (4) Very High 
(5) 
Very Low 
0-10% (1) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low 11-
20% (2) 
2 4 6 8 10 
Medium 
21-69% 
(3) 
3 6 9 12 15 
High 70-
89% (4) 
4 8 12 16 20 Li
ke
lih
o
o
d 
Very High 
90-99% 
(5) 
5 10 15 20 25 
 
Table 1: Impact and Likelihood Matrix - used as the scoring of likelihood and 
impact for all risks identified in the risk register. 
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Appendix B – Risk Impact Definitions 
 
Impact Definitions 
Magnitude  Definition 
Very High Exercise of the vulnerability - (1) may stop all company 
operations globally  or (2) may result very high loss of life 
High 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the highly costly 
loss of major tangible assets or resources; (2) may 
significantly violate, harm, or impede an organisation’s 
mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human 
death or serious injury. 
Medium 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the costly loss of 
tangible assets or resources; (2) may violate, harm, or impede 
an organisation’s mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may 
result in human injury 
Low 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the loss of some 
tangible assets or resources or (2) may noticeably affect an 
organisation’s mission, reputation, or interest. 
Very Low Exercise of the vulnerability (1) Disruption to non critical business operations at single site 
 
Table 2: Risk Impact Definitions 
Source: Derived from NIST SP 800 30 [55] 
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Appendix C – Baseline Risk Register without TPM Controls 
 
The risk register is provided in the table below.  The assessment was conducted with the assumption that appropriate SANS top 20 
controls were implemented however without Trusted Computing controls. 
 
Table 3: Risk Register without TPM Controls 
 
Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Controls [SANS Top 20 Controls][67] 
1 Theft of 
Information + 
Theft of 
Intellectual 
Property 
 
[Compromise of Information] Theft of 
information and intellectual property 
developed over many years, sometimes up 
to 15 years, including drug trials, medical 
compounds, patient information, and 
confidential research useful for competitors 
etc.  
 
Impact: 
Loss of potential source of new business 
income and competitive advantage, loss of 
patient for drugs, loss of reputation, 
regulatory fines and legal proceedings,  
business disruption, loss of customer 
confidence, affect on brand value and 
decline in share price. 
 
Medium High  Secure Configurations for Hardware and 
Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers 
 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such 
as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches 
 Boundary Defence 
 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of 
Security Audit Logs 
 Application Software Security 
 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 
 Controlled Access Based on Need to Know 
 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and 
Remediation 
 Account Monitoring and Control 
 Malware Defences 
 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, 
Protocols, and Services 
 Wireless Device Control 
 Data Loss Prevention 
 Secure Network Engineering 
 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises 
 Incident Response Capability 
 Data Recovery Capability 
 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate 
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Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Controls [SANS Top 20 Controls][67] 
Training to Fill Gaps 
2 Virus, Worms 
or other 
malicious 
code +  
Spy-ware  
[Unauthorised Actions]  Impaired business 
performance and potential corruption of 
sensitive data affecting integrity of 
information. Confidential information may be 
sent to third parties without knowledge. 
 
Impact: 
Loss of potential source of new business 
income and competitive advantage, loss of 
patient for drugs, loss of reputation, 
regulatory fines and legal proceedings,  
business disruption, loss of customer 
confidence, affect on brand value and 
decline in share price. 
 
Medium High  Secure Configurations for Hardware and 
Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers  
 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such 
as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches 
 Boundary Defence 
 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of 
Security Audit Logs 
 Application Software Security 
 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 
 Controlled Access Based on Need to Know 
 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and 
Remediation 
 Account Monitoring and Control 
 Malware Defences 
 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, 
Protocols, and Services 
 Secure Network Engineering 
 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises 
 Incident Response Capability 
 Data Recovery Capability 
 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate 
Training to Fill Gaps 
3 Intentional 
exposure of 
private or 
sensitive 
information + 
Disclosure 
[Compromise of Information] Disclosure of 
information developed over many years, 
sometimes up to 15 years, including drug 
trials, medical compounds, patient 
information, and confidential research useful 
for competitors etc.  
 
 
 
Impact: 
Loss of potential source of new business 
Medium High  Secure Configurations for Hardware and 
Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers  
 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such 
as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches 
 Boundary Defence 
 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of 
Security Audit Logs 
 Application Software Security 
 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 
 Controlled Access Based on Need to Know 
 Account Monitoring and Control 
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Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Controls [SANS Top 20 Controls][67] 
income and competitive advantage, loss of 
patient for drugs, loss of reputation, 
regulatory fines and legal proceedings,  
business disruption, loss of customer 
confidence, affect on brand value and 
decline in share price. 
 
 Malware Defences 
 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, 
Protocols, and Services 
 Wireless Device Control 
 Data Loss Prevention 
 Penetration Tests 
4 Unauthorised 
Access to/Use 
of Information 
Systems and 
Networks 
 
 
 
 
[Unauthorised Actions] Unauthorised 
access to sensitive information leading to 
information disclosure and regulatory 
violation. 
Unauthorised use of systems for illegal 
content download / distribution etc. 
Disclosure of unpublished material and leaks 
to press. 
 
Impact: 
Loss of potential source of new business 
income and competitive advantage, loss of 
patient for drugs, loss of reputation, 
regulatory fines and legal proceedings,  
business disruption, loss of customer 
confidence, affect on brand value and 
decline in share price. 
 
 Medium High  Inventory of Authorised and Unauthorised 
Devices 
 Inventory of Authorised and Unauthorised 
Software 
 Secure Configurations for Hardware and 
Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers  
 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such 
as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches 
 Boundary Defence 
 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of 
Security Audit Logs 
 Application Software Security 
 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 
 Controlled Access Based on Need to Know 
 Account Monitoring and Control 
 Malware Defences 
 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, 
Protocols, and Services 
 Wireless Device Control 
 Secure Network Engineering 
 Penetration Tests 
5 Illegal 
Generation of 
Spam Email +  
Zombie 
Machines 
 
[Compromise of Functions] Compromise 
of systems leading illegal system use for 
generating SPAM or other automated 
activity. 
Compromised systems attacking other 
entities using business resources by 
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
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Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Controls [SANS Top 20 Controls][67] 
Botnets, Zombies. 
 
Impact: 
Loss of customer confidence, degraded 
operations, loss of reputation, Judicial 
proceedings, leak to press, loss of trust, and 
disruption to partner operations. 
 
 
 
6 Remote 
Spying 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
7 Eavesdroppin
g 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
8 Theft of Media 
or Documents 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
9 Theft of 
Equipment 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
10 Retrieval of 
Recycled or 
disguarded 
media 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Very Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
11 Data from 
untrustworthy 
sources 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Very Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
12 Tampering 
with hardware 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
13 Protection 
Detection 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
14 Denial of 
Service 
Attacks 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact  
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
15 Phishing [Unauthorised Actions] Description / Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
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Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Controls [SANS Top 20 Controls][67] 
Impact 
16 Sabotage [Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
17 Unauthorised 
use of 
Equipment 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
18 Fraudulent 
copying of 
software + 
Use of 
counterfeit or 
copied 
software 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Medium Medium  All appropriate controls 
19 Corruption of 
data 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
20 Illegal 
processing of 
data 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
21 Key loggers [Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
22 Forging of 
Rights +  
Abuse of 
Rights 
[Compromise of Functions] Description / 
Impact 
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
23 Denial of 
Actions 
[Compromise of Functions] Description / 
Impact 
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
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Appendix D – Risk Register with TPM Controls 
 
The risk register is provided in the table below.  The assessment was conducted with the assumption that appropriate SANS top 20 
controls were implemented as well as the Trusted Computing controls. 
 
Table 4: Risk Register With TPM Controls 
 
Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Trusted Computing Controls Deployed  
1 Theft of 
Information + 
Theft of 
Intellectual 
Property 
 
[Compromise of Information] Theft of 
information and intellectual property 
developed over many years, sometimes up 
to 15 years, including drug trials, medical 
compounds, patient information, and 
confidential research useful for competitors 
etc.  
 
Impact: 
Loss of potential source of new business 
income and competitive advantage, loss of 
patient for drugs, loss of reputation, 
regulatory fines and legal proceedings,  
business disruption, loss of customer 
confidence, affect on brand value and 
decline in share price. 
 
 
 
 
Low High  Secure Storage 
 Platform configuration validation 
 Process Isolation 
 Symmetric Cryptography 
 Asymmetric Cryptography 
 Platform Integrity measurements 
 Conditional data release 
 Protection of Cryptographic keys 
 Protection from other execution environments 
2 Virus, Worms 
or other 
[Unauthorised Actions]  Impaired business 
performance and potential corruption of 
Very Low High  Secure Storage 
 Platform configuration validation 
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Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Trusted Computing Controls Deployed  
malicious 
code +  
Spy-ware  
sensitive data affecting integrity of 
information. Confidential information may be 
sent to third parties without knowledge. 
 
Impact: 
Loss of potential source of new business 
income and competitive advantage, loss of 
patient for drugs, loss of reputation, 
regulatory fines and legal proceedings,  
business disruption, loss of customer 
confidence, affect on brand value and 
decline in share price. 
 Process Isolation 
 Remote attestation 
 Symmetric Cryptography 
 Asymmetric Cryptography 
 Platform Integrity measurements 
 Conditional data release 
 Protection of Cryptographic keys 
 Protection from other execution environments  
3 Intentional 
exposure of 
private or 
sensitive 
information + 
Disclosure 
[Compromise of Information] Disclosure of 
information developed over many years, 
sometimes up to 15 years, including drug 
trials, medical compounds, patient 
information, and confidential research useful 
for competitors etc.  
 
Impact: 
Loss of potential source of new business 
income and competitive advantage, loss of 
patient for drugs, loss of reputation, 
regulatory fines and legal proceedings,  
business disruption, loss of customer 
confidence, affect on brand value and 
decline in share price. 
 
 
 
 
Very Low High  Secure Storage 
 Platform configuration validation 
 Process Isolation 
 Remote attestation 
 Symmetric Cryptography 
 Asymmetric Cryptography 
 Platform Integrity measurements 
 Conditional data release 
 Protection of Cryptographic keys 
 Protection from other execution environments 
4 Unauthorised 
Access to/Use 
of Information 
[Unauthorised Actions] Unauthorised 
access to sensitive information leading to 
information disclosure and regulatory 
 Low High  Secure Storage 
 Platform configuration validation 
 Process Isolation 
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Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Trusted Computing Controls Deployed  
Systems and 
Networks 
 
 
 
 
violation. 
Unauthorised use of systems for illegal 
content download / distribution etc. 
Disclosure of unpublished material and leaks 
to press. 
 
Impact: 
Loss of potential source of new business 
income and competitive advantage, loss of 
patient for drugs, loss of reputation, 
regulatory fines and legal proceedings,  
business disruption, loss of customer 
confidence, affect on brand value and 
decline in share price. 
 
 Remote attestation 
 Symmetric Cryptography 
 Asymmetric Cryptography 
 Platform Integrity measurements 
 Conditional data release 
 Protection of Cryptographic keys 
 Protection from other execution environments 
5 Illegal 
Generation of 
Spam Email +  
Zombie 
Machines 
 
[Compromise of Functions] Compromise 
of systems leading illegal system use for 
generating SPAM or other automated 
activity. 
Compromised systems attacking other 
entities using business resources by 
Botnets, Zombies. 
 
Impact: 
Loss of customer confidence, degraded 
operations, loss of reputation, Judicial 
proceedings, leak to press, loss of trust, and 
disruption to partner operations. 
 
 
Low High  Secure Storage 
 Platform configuration validation 
 Process Isolation 
 Remote attestation 
 Symmetric Cryptography 
 Asymmetric Cryptography 
 Platform Integrity measurements 
 Conditional data release 
 Protection of Cryptographic keys 
 Protection from other execution environments 
6 Remote 
Spying 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Very Low High  All appropriate controls 
7 Eavesdroppin
g 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Very Low High  All appropriate controls 
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Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Trusted Computing Controls Deployed  
8 Theft of Media 
or Documents 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
9 Theft of 
Equipment 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
10 Retrieval of 
Recycled or 
disguarded 
media 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Very Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
11 Data from 
untrustworthy 
sources 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Very Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
12 Tampering 
with hardware 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
13 Protection 
Detection 
[Compromise of Information] Description / 
Impact 
 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
14 Denial of 
Service 
Attacks 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact  
Medium High  All appropriate controls 
15 Phishing [Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
16 Sabotage [Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
17 Unauthorised 
use of 
Equipment 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
 
 
 
 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
18 Fraudulent 
copying of 
software + 
Use of 
counterfeit or 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Very Low Medium  All appropriate controls 
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Risk 
ID 
Risk [Type] / Description / Impact Likelihood Impact Trusted Computing Controls Deployed  
copied 
software 
19 Corruption of 
data 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
20 Illegal 
processing of 
data 
[Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
21 Key loggers [Unauthorised Actions] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
22 Forging of 
Rights +  
Abuse of 
Rights 
[Compromise of Functions] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
23 Denial of 
Actions 
[Compromise of Functions] Description / 
Impact 
Low High  All appropriate controls 
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Appendix E – Project Description Form 
 
MSc Information Security 
 
One copy of this form (or a typed or computer-generated version) is to be completed by each 
project student and sent (by email) to the project supervisor by the end of the second 
semester at the latest. If the project supervisor is satisfied with the contents then they should 
sign the form for their own records and inform the student. The student should keep a copy of 
the final project description form. If the project starts to deviate significantly from the originally 
approved proposal then the student should discuss this with the project supervisor and, if 
necessary, complete a revised form. 
 
 
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PROJECT CANDIDATE 
 
Name: Stephen S Khan 
 
Contact email address(es): Stephen.S.Khan@gmail.com /   
         sk@skhan.co.uk 
 
Provisional Title of Project: 
 
1.  Statement of Objectives 
a. What do you intend to achieve? 
 
1. To establish if Trusted Computing using a TPM provides an 
additonal level of data assurance on platforms compared to 
current controls. 
2. Perform a security risk assessment on using Trusted 
Computing TPM controls. 
3. Outline some of the challenges in establishing trust. 
 
b. Why have you chosen the proposed project? 
 
I have conducted risk assessements and due diligence on partners 
during the course of my career for many years. I always found 
controls around data protection to be very subjective until I came 
across Trusted Computing at Royal Holloway. Existing mechanisms 
didn’t seem to be effective in establishing trust in business 
relationships. 
I wanted to explore platform data assurance with Trusted Computing 
using a TPM.  
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2.  Methods to be used  
a. How do you intend to achieve the objectives listed above? 
 
I propose to draw on my own experience and draw on other security 
risk management professionals working in the private and public 
sector. I used a number of methods including the following: 
 
1. Search for documentation across multiple forums, working 
groups, conferences. 
2. Material form Trusted Computing conference papers. 
3. Materials published in OpenTC.net 
4. Interviews with people involved Trusted computing and 
business to business risk management across different 
organisations in public and private sectors. 
5. Source material from past Royal Holloway reports 
6. Examination of course material on Trusted computing. 
7. Books on Trusted Computing 
8. Interview / Open discussion with Industry experts. 
 
b. What is your strategy for getting started? 
 
1. Review current information available from TCG and OpenTC 
website. 
2. Review books on trusted computing. 
3. Discussion with security risk management professional about 
establishing trust in business partnerships. 
  
3. The work plan 
Provide a rough schedule, showing any key milestones in the project. 
 
4. June 09 – Review information and make notes. 
5. Early July 09 – Conduct interviews with industry experts, 
government risk managers and private sector security risk 
managers.  
6. Late July – Start to prepare report and review more source 
materials. 
7. August 09 – Prepare report 
8. Early September - Hand in report 
 
4. Additional comments 
Use this section to make extra comments on the proposal on matters not 
covered above (use extra space if necessary). Include details of any 
involvement of external organisations. 
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TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PROJECT SUPERVISOR 
 
I approve the attached project plan. 
 
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
 
   
Name: 
 
 
 
 
 
Date:  
